The humanities has a secure place in this broad and peaceful postwar consensus. Dominick LaCapra once remarked that the research university is structured like a nuclear family: the scientists are the dads, and they go out and make the money, and the humanists are the moms, and they stay home and take care of the kids. During the 1980s, staying home paid off. Humanists might have been junior partners in university governance, but we prospered along with our scientist husbands. Humanities departments began hiring again after a fifteen-year stagnation, positions for newly validated specialties expanded with the canon, and traditionally unacceptable or "minority" fields such as lesbian and gay studies, feminist studies, popular culture, and African-American literature seemed on the threshold of qualified prosperity. Perhaps as a result of these trickled-down yet hardwon gains, in ten years of graduate and faculty employment at three very different research universities I have yet to hear any sustained faculty critique of the structural features that silently determine the university's mission and products day by day. I long ago concluded that humanists were largely content with the political structures of their institutions, provided they were fiscally sound. Feelings of deprivation or neglect would be addressed through individual success, rivalry with kindred humanist groups, program development, and local struggles with specific administrators. In the foreseeable future, there would be no general questioning of funding ratios with science and other fields or calls for glasnost in existing forms of managerial authority.
The first context for the PC wars, then, is the humanities' general contentment with the university's managerial democracy. The second is an identity crisis at the humanities' literary end. During the 1980s, traditional definitions of literary study as general enlightenment yielded more than in previous decades to those defining literary study as part of a spectrum of human sciences. Literary study, particularly at larger universities, has been shifting from literary history to cultural problems, from a field defined by its object of study (the expanded literary canon) to one defined by its questions and methods.6 But in the 1980s this move away from the traditional mission was accelerated without becoming explicit about a general mission to replace it. Giving the humanities a new research identity, as diverse as that would inevitably be, would involve the analysis of the relation between the humanities and contemporary American society that the 1980s did not provide. The analyses that did exist were sporadic and often recriminatory. Thus the humanities still has currency with the public 6. Similarly, Jonathan Culler contrasts "two general models" for recent humanities research: "reproducing culture and the social order" and the "production of knowledge" (Jonathan Culler, Framing the Sign: Criticism and Its Institutions [Norman, Okla., 1988], p. 33). through its roles as cultural curator and teacher of skills, but it lacks similar status as a field of research. PC bashing simply exploited an identity crisis that was already well along.
These two contexts for 1991 's PC debates have politics in commonthe politics of university governance and of the public role of critical cultural studies. The common politics is that of managerial democracy inside and outside the U.S. university, which addresses social conflicts through procedural reconciliations. With notable but rare exceptions, literary studies had not openly challenged this type of administration or its effects on its own research until the insurgence of precisely those fields-gender studies, race studies, queer theory, and others-that the Right has fingered as "political."
Rejecting Politics: The 1980s Right
Attacks on the academic humanities have been built on the tradition refurbished in the Reagan eighties when admonishments from policy makers and education officials became part of scholars' discussions of their field. These demanded a limited compliance that could not be mistaken for a threat to civil liberties. The early requests were restricted to rehabilitating teaching functions in the humanities while posing little danger to variegated research. Thus William Bennett's relatively modest proposal "to reclaim a legacy" asks that the humanities "accept its vital role as conveyor of the accumulated wisdom of our civilization." Lynne Cheney's 1988 National Endowment for the Humanities report on the humanities in America, while sometimes criticized for its attack on academic specialization, mostly focuses on the need for improved public access to this accumulated wisdom. These documents seemed compatible with the continued expansion of humanities funding and even with their "democratic" dissemination. 7 Other works of that decade offered more confining descriptions of what humanities tradition should look like. I am thinking particularly of Allan Bloom's The Closing of the American Mind (1987) and Roger Kimball's Tenured Radicals (published in 1990 but whose primal scenes occur between 1986 and 1988). These books discuss an abundance of deficiencies in the modern university's treatment of the humanities: the loss of canonical texts, trendy methodologies, the fragmentation of the knowledge base, the teaching of material for reasons other than abstract quality or tradition. Rather than being exposed to the values and ideas that make Western civilization a global triumph and that undergird our prosperity and morality as a nation, students today are likely to be taught that no values are better than any others, and that they can believe what they please. They are exposed to "nihilism, American style," to name a section of Bloom's book, or to "relativism," to cite Kimball's definition of the "New Sophistry," or to Theory, and so on. These trends expressed themselves in the increasing internationalization of English departments under the auspices of studies of post-or neocolonial culture; they appeared in public debates about the literary canon and about the immorality of deconstruction as allegedly revealed by Paul de Man's wartime journalism.
But this large host of concerns usually boiled down to a complaint about the presence of "politics." In each case the problem was the infection of the nation's representative culture by current controversies and, more pointedly, the interests of discontented groups.
The 1980s jeremiads, though often intricate, reiterate a desire to preserve art from politics that was most systematically articulated by Matthew Arnold's nineteenth-century plan to govern the conflicts of national life with the best ideas from the past. Kimball, for example, invokes an Arnold who "looked to criticism to provide a bulwark against ideology, against interpretations that are subordinated to essentially political interests."8 Like Bloom, Bennett, and others, Kimball demands that the modern academy regard criticism in the same way: as a realm of "truth and virtue" that remains unaffected by partiality and conflict.9 When these authors contemplate contemporary U.S. society they sound much as Arnold did when he gazed on the spectacle of the French Revolution. In France, Arnold saw "a whole nation ... penetrated with an enthusiasm for pure reason," but the wonderful "force, truth, and universality of [its] ideas" were destroyed by one thing: "the mania for giving [them] an immediate political and practical application."'1 Thus, in the Arnoldian tradition, politics corrupts reason while criticism preserves reason's liberatory powers. It represents right, where "right is something moral, and implies inward recognition, free assent of the will."" Society is a mess, coercive and chaotic. Politics is an enslaving anarchy without orders from above. Criticism, "the best that has been thought and known in the world," provides those higher orders.12 It mani- Why wasn't there more public response?4 This lack of major response can be explained in part by the manifest fact that upheaval was far more dramatic outside the university than in, and that most law-and-order energies were focused there. On top of this, the attacks were anecdotal, transparently idiosyncratic, and too sweepingly rejectionist to convene more than a self-appointed rump parliament of bypassed public guardians. And much of their fire was drawn off by the de Man controversy. Furthermore, liberal educators had two good lines of defense. They pointed out that knowledge in general and the Right's accusations in particular are always political in a broad sense. They also noted that it is normal for humanistic knowledge to grow and change in the way that distinguishes any living set of disciplines, not to mention any democratic institution. On the first point, liberals could reiterate the long-standing pragmatist argument that knowledge is always inflected by the historical conditions and interests through which it is pursued. The Right could respond only by tilting at an imaginary reductionism that purportedly claims that knowledge reflects exactly the interests of the knower, and by searching with little success for a crudely deterministic relativism.5 On the second, the Right was unwilling or unable to elaborate the kind of methodological and conceptual changes that a truly disinterested humanijust anyone "doing as one likes": "For a long time ... the strong feudal habits of subordination and deference continued to tell upon the working class. The modern spirit has now almost entirely dissolved those habits, and the anarchical tendency of our worship of freedom in and for itself.., is becoming very manifest" (ibid., pp. 118-19 canon police and related attempts to suppress controversial ideas as "political." When told that this censorship menace had appeared on the centerleft, it felt a patriotic ire. Newsweek ended 1990 with a cover story on the left-wing "thought police." This article's data, written up by Jerry Adler, suggest that the staff could find very little in the way of empirical referents for the PC movement; they cobbled it together from a series of disparate campus incidents in which a racial or sexual minority rebels against a routine slight coming from someone or some group for whom such back talk is "nontraditional." What to these students were often acts of disputation, remedy, reform, or clarified dialogue are described by Adler as insidiously totalitarian and part of a widespread popular front falling just short of conspiracy.
How do these incidents of redress or protest get translated as attacks on freedom? Adler used a prefab anticommunism: "There are in fact some who recognize the tyranny of PC, but see it only as a transitional phase, which will no longer be necessary once the virtues of tolerance are internalized. Does that sound familiar? It's the dictatorship of the proletariat, to be followed by the withering away of the state. These should be interesting years."'8 It is Adler himself who sounds familiar. Even if his targets do comprise reborn Leninists (strangely preaching tolerance and an end to hate speech) we might still marvel at the perfect malleability of anticommunist rhetoric as it moves to fit the projected source of almost any breach of consent. That his targets are mostly students preoccupied with antidefamation and civil rights issues-who are often simply opposing the more everyday barriers to the "common citizenship" their detractors desire and who usually oppose these barriers with the help of already existing legislation-makes it still more remarkable that language used during the cold war against an apparently expansionist nuclear superpower would be immediately redeployed against twenty-year-old members of traditionally powerless American social groups whose grievances the author admits as valid. The dangers become equivalent when the incidents involve people of color who, troublingly, convinced the authorities to side with them. Communistic and racialized others reveal the constant vulnerability of American authority.
Newsweek was not alone in comparing multiculturalism to communist militarism. Washington-based columnist Charles Krauthammer described race consciousness in the same way. He first identified a renewed "Socialist" threat to American peace in similarities between certain political trends in foreign countries and American universities. These menacing foreign trends are environmentalism and peace, which are bad enough in themselves but still worse in international solidarity with their domestic mutation, deconstruction. Deconstruction is not just a decadent nihilism that the public has prudently ignored but a trojan horse for an "intellectu-18.Jerry Adler, "Taking Offense," Newsweek, 24 Dec. 1990, p. 54. What Was Political Correctness? ally bankrupt 'civil-rights community.'" This civil rights community, for Krauthammer, "poses a threat that no outside agent in this post-Soviet world can match"-"the setting of one ethnic group against another, the fracturing not just of American society but of the American idea." PC is a new form of communism because it allows for ethnic differences that are not subsumed into a common culture. 19 A further corroboration that the Right fears racial difference rather than censorship came from syndicated columnist George Will, who demanded that America treat the politicized humanities as a covert operation. We must attend, he wrote in Newsweek, to the many small skirmishes that rarely rise to public attention but cumulatively condition the nation's cultural, and then political, life. In this low-visibility, high-intensity war, Lynne Cheney is secretary of domestic defense. The foreign adversaries her husband, Dick, must keep at bay are less dangerous, in the long run, than the domestic forces with which she must deal. Those forces are fighting against the conservation of the common culture that is the nation's social cement.20
Will stops short of calling on the NEH to give fellowships for organizing troop parades, but he does sound the alarm about "domestic forces," which declares a new civil war at the very moment when American sovereignty seemed most triumphant. Our only defense against this fragmentation, he suggests, has been the unifying supervision of "common culture," but this is contested by the excessive self-assertion of minority groups.
Much PC bashing is like Will's in slant if not in pitch-an Arnoldian vision of anarchy without firm rule from above. As Arnold used to say, "force till right is ready." Ideally, a different Cheney would supervise each half of this marriage of light and power. The danger they forestall is that, as Evelyn Waugh says in Kimball's concluding citation, "'once the prisons of the mind have been opened, the orgy is on' " (TR, p. 207). The opened mind, for the nineties Right, would produce not just a political orgy but a race orgy, a recipe for social collapse. 25. D'Souza's dislike for racial difference is particularly striking because he claims to revere differences of nearly every other kind. He complains-sincerely, in my view-that "most American students seem to display striking agreement on all the basic questions of life. Indeed, they appear to regard a true difference of opinion, based upon convictions that are firmly and intensely held, as dangerously dogmatic and an offense against the social etiquette of tolerance" (IE, p. 231).
26. This last phrase is Avery Gordon's, whom I would like to thank for continual discussions and invaluable insight about the issues this paper addresses.
27. Noting that in nearly all measures the social and educational resources for African Americans have been getting worse, Henry Louis Gates, Jr., observes that "the implicitly racist rhetoric of [William] Bennett's civilizing mission has unfolded precisely as affirmative action programs on campus have become ineffective window-dressing operations, necessary 'evils' maintained to preserve the fiction of racial fairness and openness in the truly campus multiculturalism no longer seem to conservatives like a potential showcase of healthy American diversity?
In addressing this question, one cannot simply invoke these conservatives' racism. Precisely because of its racist histories, the U.S. is as fecund as any society in proliferating variations of racialized thinking. Using the term racism can too easily grant it an explanatory power when its own existence and workings themselves need explanation.28 Further, as an explanation, racism lumps together a wide range of behaviors that run from Indian killing and Jim Crow lynching to "color-blind" institutional discrimination. Racism, with its historical connection to segregationism, favors the former side of this spectrum, and tends to obscure the fact that the racialist thinking of elite, educated, usually Euro-American professionals is, at least rhetorically, antisegregationist. D'Souza, for example, does not lament what he calls "the recolorization of America" but only "minority demands for self-segregation" (IE, p. 48). Bloom also complains not about the presence of students of color but about their "doing it by themselves."29 The Right is not calling for segregationism but for the opposite, a well-governed integration, and their racial anxieties cannot be reduced to racism in its conventional sense.
Integrationism, according to Gary Peller's recent description, "identifies racial oppression in the social structure of prejudice and stereotype based on skin color, and equates progress with transcending a racial consciousness about the world. It might seem at first that linking nineties PC-bashing conservatives to racial integrationism makes them acceptably moderate, but this is not the case. During the 1980s the Right promoted integrationist "common culturalism," but only while simultaneously separating integrationism from any tendency toward egalitarian pluralism. Michael Omi and Howard Winant have nicely described this double movement: "In the aftermath of the 1960s, any effective challenge to the egalitarian ideals framed by the minority movements could no longer rely on the racism of the past. Racial equality had to be acknowledged as a desirable goal. But the meaning of equality, and the proper means for achieving it, remained matters of considerable debate."31 The Right, of course, argued that equality means equality of opportunity, which it further defined as the chance to apply and compete regardless of the material disadvantages and systematic disparities that influenced the outcome. Were equality of opportunity to have suddenly produced cross-racial equality of outcome, the Right would likely have denounced it, having insistently stigmatized equality of outcome as sufficient proof of state tyranny. This was so much the case that liberal demands for equal outcomes across race (and to a lesser extent, gender) have all but vanished from public view, and even the fallback defenses of equality of opportunity were soft-pedaled by their few Euro-American defenders. For more than a decade, equal opportunity employment practices were attacked as "quotas" and "special preferences" that penalized white citizens for racial crimes they did not commit. At the same time, conservatives portrayed every kind of social equality as a danger to economic efficiency, affluence, and meritocracy. In this environment, integration formed an alliance with inequality. Integrationism favored top-down social discipline at least as much as it promoted racial equality.
This inequality, when linked to the idea of a common racial culture, extends to the public realm those inequalities of administrative order in which most Americans spend their working lives. Integrationism partially replaces exclusion from membership as a mechanism of producing cultural unity, but exclusion from power remained the common effect.32 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971), construed Title VII to proscribe "not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in practice." Under this basis for liability, which is known as the "disparate-impact" theory and which is involved in this case, a facially neutral employment practice may be deemed violative of Title VII without evidence of the employer's subjective intent to discriminate that is required in a "disparatetreatment" case.33
The concept of disparate-impact traces racist effects to institutional structure rather than to individual bigotry. It does not limit itself to anomalies of racial prejudice but challenges the normal operation of a system in which administrative power has the appearance of neutrality. It refuses to focus only on individual bias, on the intrusion of personal politics into an impartial system of business practices, for it supposes that such racial politics can be part of the "impartial" system itself.
White's opinion repudiates direct racial discrimination or segregation, and cannot be considered racist in that sense. The "employer's selec- White's ruling defends rational and systemic as opposed to prejudiced discrimination in two major ways. It shifts the burden of proof of disparate impact from the managers of the practice to those who challenge it (WCP, p. 659).34 More fundamentally, it affirms the priority of the needs of business to those of employees or the general citizenry. In earlier cases, like Griggs, the Court had ruled that the employees' complaint would prevail over a management preference unless management could show business necessity; employees were granted real parity with their bosses in all but extreme circumstances. White rejects this precedent by declaring that the company need not demonstrate business necessity but only a reasonable preference.35 Furthermore, though the employer must be willing to try to justify the preference, it need not actually succeed in persuading the affected persons or the courts.36 White augments managerial power by allowing it to make laws out of its preferences rather than out of "necessity," and by allowing it to govern without the consent of the governed.
White White is protecting the right of management's "chosen practices" to prevail in whatever ostensibly democratic consultation they have established with the employees. Varying a phrase three times in a display of its unmistakable ascendancy in his mind, White declares "legitimate business goals" to be a principle to which the public judiciary must conform. Management also trumps the laws of economic efficiency through the priority of unspecified "other burdens." All parties, White supposes, must submit their various claims to the laws of business as interpreted by those in management positions.
Racial difference intruded on the cannery suit as an obstacle to the free circulation of administrative prerogatives. The cannery employees made a claim about their own preferences regarding the social and economic effects of company policy and presumed their autonomous agency. They took some sovereignty from management and spread it around. The danger, for Justice White, lies not so much in damaging white supremacy as in damaging what white supremacy symbolizes to white elites: management's exclusive power to decide about race and virtually everything else. Since managerial authority must enforce a great deal of cultural sameness, management will stay "white" as long as it stays management. The principles of management allow Justice White to maintain racial divisions without making a racial case. Managers don't discriminate, but all good management does. White's opinion can reject racial discrimination even as itjustifies the racialized hierarchies of managerial order.
Racial outcomes cannot be judged by whether a person of color is excluded or included from a system unless the system's structure of governance has been analyzed. In discussing the integrationist defense of managerial authority, I do not mean to suggest that U.S. racisms are reducible to antidemocratic tendencies or that racism is a secondary characteristic of managerial elitism. U.S. institutions seem so frequently to be inhibited by a primal white "fear of a black planet" that forgetting that race is "a pre-eminently social phenomenon" is often a functional shortcut to accurate pictures of everyday interactions.37 But as a phenomenon inextricably though variably related to a multitude of other social factors, racism must be learned and relearned, and for this it needs schoolrooms; in the eighties one of these schoolrooms was the hierarchical, managerial integrationism that the Reagan culture heralded as the "Freedom Road" of "minority opportunity." It is impossible to understand racism in the Bloom never considers the possibility that the "factual equality" of a research community is a prerequisite to free discourse. He instead describes equality as the loss of individual consciousness in a totalitarian herd. Bloom of course likes loss of distinct individuality in "absolutely one soul," but not a loss of self into equality. Oneness is freedom, but equality is totalitarian, because freedom entails a higher authority. This specter of equality, left over from the sixties, may help explain the otherwise bizarre right-wing axiom of the nineties that civil liberties and multiculturalism are Stalinist attacks on freedom. And it exposes the politics of this equation: an unqualified hostility to the idea of a democracy that rests on some kind of egalitarianism rather than on the rule of great ideas, canonical texts, and their authorized agents in the field. Egalitarian democracy means civil war or, as a first step, undergraduates who feel no awe before the slave democracy of the Greeks.
The academic Right's concern for submission also targets the democratized classroom. One example, citing some evidence of Lynne Cheney's, claims that "a salient symptom of the illness of our institutions of 'higher learning' is the proliferation of junk courses .... The University of Delaware has a course in death-related issues in which a computer simulation of the student's own death 'puts you in touch with your own feelings.' " A course on "Tarot-Card Reading, Dowsing, Divining and Tea-Leaf Reading" at Boston University is described by a student as "one of those classic courses where you learn something about yourself."52 The authors dismiss these courses not because of their particular content or methodology but because they presume the importance of the lives of their students. The predetermined truth the Right wishes to associate with political correctness is in these examples a routine component of its own definition of legitimate classroom topics, since they seek to exclude the supplements or challenges to the truth that arise from students' active participation. This rejection of democratic knowledge has also controlled much of the recent debate about Afrocentric curricula in public education. One tactic of critics of Afrocentricity might have been simply to accept the need to change the presently low visibility of the non-European civilizations taught in humanities courses and go on from there to help sort likely facts and hypotheses from dubious wishfulness, with the background understanding that cultural knowledges are not all readily translatable into established concepts. But this difficult collaborative project has not gotten off the ground. Many observers have categorically dismissed the Afrocentricity movement by describing it as responsive to the masses-as teaching "'what people think is important for [students'] self-esteem.' "53 The sometimes-liberal Arthur Schlesinger claims that a New York State curricular report, authored by an advocate of Afrocentricity, has an interest in history "not as an intellectual discipline but rather as social and psychological therapy whose primary function is to raise the self-esteem of children from minority groups."54 The issue for Schlesinger seems not the particular errors of fact or interpretation but the idea that a community might have made their own decisions about how knowledge is to be structured and used. Reducing Afrocentricity to therapy preempts serious analysis of particular historical accounts in the new textbooks and replaces it with the a priori discrediting of the ideas of scholars mindful of a community's cultural independence. This is obviously not to say that xenophobic Afrocentrisms should be adopted, although Afrocentricity's tendency to mythologize is in keeping with the Euro-American tradition of whitewashing U.S. history for its children. It does indicate, however, Cheney's and Schlesinger's assumption that accurate scholarship, in the absence of specific empirical indicators, has been undermined through contact with the needs and interests of a particular community, with their desire for autonomy and recognition, with their desire to separate their histories from the rise of Europe.
Without demonstrating substantive problems, the Right rejects the category of "democratic knowledge" as a contradiction in terms. This idea goes beyond the uncontroversial claim that standards and beliefs are constitutive of teaching and research and must be administered by credentialed and experienced personnel, and that most standards, structures, traditions, and values always remain in place. It extends to denying some democratic truisms: that genuine knowledge emerges from the experience of subordinate or unauthorized voices, from questioning authority, or from the reciprocal interaction of untrained students and trained but receptive instructors. It denies that standards, though never absent, should be directly and indirectly, knowingly and unwittingly subject to the continual pressure of the desires and interests of those whom authority; amidst all the dispersal, mobility, and regulated autonomy of flexible management, unifying control might become too diffuse. Management's democratic elements might absorb enough participatory inclusion and differential input to change into something more self-directed. The conservative humanities puts the sovereignty back in flexibility by reemphasizing the masters who do not command but only invite our love of their superiority. Rejecting simple despotism, the Right works to maintain the double-edged power of managerial supervision. Its job is to make this top-down flexibility appear more beautiful than democracy.
Post-PC
All this notwithstanding, the PC crisis recalls the humanities' conceptual resources as much as it might discourage us from using them. As the debate dwindles in its present form, it is easier to notice that the siege had little negative effect on some areas of the humanities. Race studies, queer theory, colonial and postcolonial studies, and others didn't miss a beat throughout the fitful attempts at increased discipline. Some excellent prospects can be sketchily inferred from the histories of both the PC debates and of those who evaded them.56
Politics. Contrary to humanistic myth, politics does not block outreach but allows it to happen. Enhancing political knowledge would mean moving beyond the helpful truism that "everything we do is political" to reckoning with the effects of politics as everyday governance. This involves thinking through the actual relations in which we find ourselves (institutional positions, power differences, and so on) rather than through ideal relations (shared values, common backgrounds) with which literary study is overendowed. Some of the strongest fields in the PC period were those that looked beyond an unreal commonality at their relation to school, community, and state.
Democratic theory. Democracy is no panacea, but still needs development. This would not involve replacing our ongoing research but pursuing it with more awareness of the extent to which even oppositional work has tended to take managerial democracy for granted. The humanities is unsurpassed in knowledge of exactly the kind of double-edged mechanisms on which liberal managerial forms depend, but the most influential result of this knowledge has been to elaborate democracy's "radical impossibility."57 Impossible, yes and no, but in any case the practicalities of increased cost-cutting and legislative intervention will likely force us to defend ourselves by defending self-management. We will need to have 
